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INDEFINITENESS IN INTER PARTES 
REVIEW: THE EXISTING QUAGMIRE 
AND A PATH FORWARD 
CHRISTOPHER S. GEYER, DANIEL C. TUCKER, JENCY J. MATHEW* 
Under Section 112(b) of the Patent Act, patent claims must satisfy a 
definiteness requirement by “pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”1  
Indefiniteness is intertwined with determining a patent’s scope through claim 
construction. 2  Because determining the scope of challenged claims is a 
prerequisite to deciding the issues of anticipation and obviousness raised in 
an inter partes review (“IPR”),3 indefiniteness lurks in the background of 
IPR proceedings.4 The relevant statutory provision requiring the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (the “Board”) to issue a final written decision deciding the 
patentability of any claim challenged in a petition, Section 318, does not 
expressly limit the statutory bases on which claims may be invalidated,5 
suggesting the possibility that the Board could invalidate claims as indefinite 
 
 * Christopher S. Geyer is Associate General Counsel at Appian Corporation, responsible for 
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several national law firms, representing clients in patent disputes before district courts, the PTAB, and 
the Federal Circuit. Daniel C. Tucker and Jency J. Mathew are attorneys at Finnegan, Henderson, 
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. Daniel focuses his practice on the interplay among district court patent 
litigation, PTAB post-grant proceedings, and Federal Circuit appeals. Jency focuses her practice on patent 
litigation before federal district courts and the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”), and patent 
portfolio development. The views expressed herein are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect 
the positions of Appian Corporation or Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
 2. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Indefiniteness is a matter 
of claim construction. . . .”). 
 3. E.g., Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00036, Paper 65 at 7 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 7, 2014) (it “is axiomatic” that the first step in determining anticipation and obviousness is 
“know[ing] what is being claimed”). 
 4. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014) (to satisfy the definiteness 
requirement of “§ 112, ¶ 2. . .[,] a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution 
history, [must] inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 318. 
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in an IPR. Yet the Board has interpreted Section 314, the statutory provision 
governing the bases for petitioning IPR,6 and dicta from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Cuozzo, 7  as precluding the Board from canceling claims as 
indefinite in an IPR. 8  Applying this understanding, the Board has often 
determined that a claim challenged in an IPR is indefinite though declining 
to cancel it as such, while simultaneously finding the claim’s lack of clarity 
precludes a determination of the statutorily permissible bases of anticipation 
and obviousness. 9  The result wastes time and money, leaving everyone 
unsatisfied. Parties, including potential defendants, face the ongoing 
uncertainty of a claim that has survived IPR with the black mark of an 
officially weightless, though perhaps persuasive, agency pronouncement of 
indefiniteness. 
In this article, Part I summarizes several approaches the Board has taken 
in handling claims it recognizes to be indefinite. Then, Part II examines the 
text and purpose of the statute to consider whether it precludes the Board 
from canceling claims as indefinite. Finally, Part III suggests modest 
amendments to Sections 311 and 318 that would expressly grant the Board 
statutory authority in IPRs to cancel indefinite claims. Part IV offers brief 
concluding thoughts. 
I. CURRENT BOARD APPROACH TO ADDRESSING  
INDEFINITENESS ISSUES DURING IPRS 
In passing the America Invents Act (“AIA”), Congress authorized the 
filing of IPR petitions on a limited number of bases. The “petition provision,” 
Section 311(b), restricts the scope of IPR petitions to anticipation and 
obviousness grounds, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, respectively: “A 
petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 
or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 
102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed 
publications.”10 
In contrast, the “final written decision provision,” Section 318(a), 
places no limitations on the grounds on which the Board can decide the 
 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 314. 
 7. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016). 
 8. E.g., Oticon Med. AB v. Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB, No. IPR2017-01018, Paper 52 at 
14 n.9 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2018) (“[W]e may not cancel a claim in an inter partes review by finding that 
claim indefinite.”) (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42). 
 9. See infra Section II. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
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patentability of the challenged claims: “If an inter partes review is instituted 
and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall 
issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent 
claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 
316(d).”11 
The plain language of Section 318(a) thus gives the Board latitude to 
decide “the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” 
and is not expressly limited to the grounds petitioned under Sections 102 or 
103.12 The Board, however, has refused to invalidate claims challenged in an 
IPR on bases other than anticipation and obviousness. 13  This presents 
problems because the indefiniteness of the challenged claims may prevent a 
comparison of the claims with prior art. 
The Board has repeatedly faced issues of indefiniteness at the institution 
and trial stages. We divide the Board’s treatment of indefinite claims into 
three groupings, based on the stage at which the indefiniteness issues are 
identified and whether the claims can be compared to the prior art. The 
variety of approaches corresponding to each factual scenario is summarized 
in the chart below and explained in additional detail in the sections that 
follow.14 
 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (emphasis added). 
 12. Id. 
 13. E.g., eBay Inc. v. Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty. Ltd., No. IPR2016-01829, Paper 66 at 5 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2018). 
 14. Partial denial of institution has only occurred in proceedings instituted before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), in which the Supreme Court held 






to Prior Art? 
Board’s Various Approaches to  
Addressing Indefinite Claims 
Institution Yes • Partial denial of institution (Pre-SAS). 
• Full institution, including indefinite claims (Post-SAS). 
Trial Yes • Determine that claims are indefinite and terminate 
proceedings prior to final written decision. 
• Determine that claims are indefinite but provide no 
subsequent decision on patentability. Determine that claims 
are indefinite and conclude Petitioner failed to meet its 
burden of showing unpatentability. 
Trial No • Determine that claims are indefinite and compare 
challenged claims to prior art. 
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A. Indefiniteness Presented at Institution Stage 
The Board has addressed indefinite claims at the institution stage, often 
finding that indefiniteness prevented review of those claims during IPR. As 
the Board has explained, when claims “are not amenable to construction,” 
the Board is “unable to conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
Petitioner would prevail” in challenging those claims.15 
Institution decisions have been affected by the SAS Institute Inc. v. 
Iancu decision, in which the Supreme Court held that the Board’s practice of 
partial institution was statutorily impermissible.16 Prior to SAS, the Board 
was able to institute on some claims in a petition, while denying institution 
on any indefinite claims in the same petition. For example, in Apple Inc. v. 
Immersion Corp., the Board determined that because the specification 
“fail[ed] to disclose sufficient structure” for a means-plus-function term it 
was “unable to determine the scope and meaning” of numerous claims.17 The 
Board’s inability to determine the meaning of the indefinite claims meant it 
could not “ascertain [the] differences between the claimed subject matter and 
the prior art” as to those claims.18 Consequently, the Board denied institution 
of the indefinite claims, while instituting review of the non-means-plus-
function claims.19 
However, SAS’s holding that partial institution practice is statutorily 
impermissible foreclosed the possibility that the Board could single out only 
definite claims for institution.20 Several cases that were pending when the 
Supreme Court issued the opinion in SAS illustrate this point. For example, 
in Oticon Medical AB v. Cochlear Bone Anchored Solutions AB, the Board 
selectively instituted the IPR on certain claims challenged by the petitioner, 
while denying institution on several other claims it deemed to be indefinite 
under Section 112.21 But after SAS, the Board modified its initial institution 
decision to include in the IPR the claims for which the Board had previously 
 
 15. Facebook, Inc. v. TLI Commc’ns LLC, No. IPR2014-00566, Paper 14 at 13 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 15, 
2014) (denying institution of petition because indefinite claim language prevented Petitioner from 
meeting the reasonable likelihood burden). 
 16. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“[W]hen § 318(a) says the Board’s final written decision ‘shall’ resolve 
the patentability of ‘any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,’ it means the Board must address every 
claim the petitioner has challenged.”) (emphasis in original). 
 17. No. IPR2016-01372, Paper 7 at 19–20 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2017). 
 18. Id. at 20.  
 19. Id. at 45. 
 20. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (“There is no room in this scheme for a wholly unmentioned ‘partial 
institution’ power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decision.”). 
 21. No. IPR2017-01018, Paper 7 at 11, 26–27 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 5, 2017).  
 
INDEFINITENESS IN(DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2019  9:49 PM 
2019 INDEFINITENESS IN INTER PARTES REVIEW 133 
denied institution. 22  The Board ultimately concluded in its final written 
decision that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the indefinite claims 
were unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.23 Notably, the Board 
defended its selective institution with a nod to the limitations it perceived as 
being imposed by Section 318.24 
Likewise, in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Huawei Technologies Co., the 
Board sua sponte addressed claim indefiniteness in the final written 
decision.25 In a pre-SAS decision, the Board originally declined institution of 
means-plus-function claims because the petitioner did not identify structure 
associated with those claims, but it instituted review of non-means claims.26 
After SAS, the Board ordered institution on the means claims.27 In the final 
written decision, the Board independently reviewed the means claims, 
concluding that owing to the lack of structure in the specification, it was 
“unable to construe the meaning” of those claims and, further, was unable to 
determine whether the claims were obvious over the prior art.28 Though the 
Board ultimately concluded that the petitioner “failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence” that the means-plus-function claims were 
obvious, the Board’s extensive analysis of the claims, and ultimate 
conclusion of their indefiniteness,29 casts at least some doubt on the patent 
owner’s ability to assert those claims successfully in subsequent district 
court litigation.30 
Standing in contrast to these cases, the Board has instituted proceedings 
despite acknowledging the potential indefiniteness of the challenged claims. 
 
 22. Oticon Med. AB v. Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB, No. IPR2017-01018, Paper 33 at 5 
(P.T.A.B. May 8, 2018).  
 23. Oticon Med. AB v. Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB, No. IPR2017-01018, Paper 52 at 88 
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2018). 
 24. Id. at 14 n.9 (“[N]or does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its statutory limits 
by, for example, canceling a patent claim for ‘indefiniteness under § 112’ in inter partes review.”) 
(quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016)). 
 25. No. IPR2017-01471, Paper 49 at 44–48 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2018) (conducting independent search 
for structure corresponding to means claims before concluding same claims indefinite for failure to 
disclose such structure). 
 26. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. IPR2017-01471, Paper 12 at 27 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
8, 2017). 
 27. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. IPR2017-01471, Paper 25 at 2–3 (P.T.A.B. May 
8, 2018). 
 28. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. IPR2017-01471, Paper 49 at 48 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
4, 2018). 
 29. Id. at 44–48. 
 30. Jonathan DeFosse & Jonathan Stroud, Indefinitely Maybe: Raising § 112(B) in Inter Partes 
Review, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 351, 375–87 (2017) (discussing general tendency of district courts to refuse to 
adopt Board’s indefiniteness findings but on occasion relying on those findings to hold claims invalid). 
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For instance, after SAS, in Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Alkermes 
Pharma Ireland Ltd., the Board instituted the proceeding despite 
acknowledging potential issues of “claim clarity—or even indefiniteness” 
because the claimed element encompassed a range of “values reported in the 
[prior art]” and was therefore sufficiently broad “to create a reasonable 
likelihood that it reads on the prior art that is asserted here.”31 As another 
example, in an institution decision predating SAS, in Vibrant Media Corp. v. 
General Electric Co., the Board instituted review of independent system 
claim 9 and two of its dependent claims, even though the dependent claims 
recited “the method of claim 9” when referring to the independent system 
claim.32 In the institution decision, the Board instructed the patent owner to 
“provide sufficient explanation or evidence as to why [the dependent] claims 
are not indefinite in its patent owner response.”33 Practitioners should be 
aware of the Board’s tendency to ignore indefiniteness issues at institution if 
it determined that the potentially indefinite claims may be invalid under 
Sections 102 or 103. 
B. Indefiniteness Presented in Trial Stage and  
Claims Cannot Be Compared to Prior Art 
Indefiniteness issues may remain hidden at institution, only to arise 
during trial and impede the Board’s ability to construe one or more claim 
limitations. 34  Because the scope and meaning of the claims must be 
ascertained before they can be compared to the prior art, 35  latent 
indefiniteness issues that arise first during trial have the potential to impact 
the course of the proceeding significantly. That is, it may be impossible for 
the Board to identify similarities or differences between the prior art and a 
claim that does not “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]”36 the 
subject matter of the invention, pursuant to the definiteness requirement.37 
 
 31. No. IPR2018-00943, Paper 8 at 12 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018). 
 32. No. IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 2013). 
 33. Id. at 48. 
 34. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] claim cannot 
be both indefinite and anticipated.”). 
 35. TI Grp. Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., LLC, 375 F.3d 1126, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“Validity analysis is a two-step procedure: ‘The first step involves the proper interpretation of the claims. 
The second step involves determining whether the limitations of the claims as properly interpreted are 
met by the prior art.’”) (citing Beachcombers, Int’l, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 
1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
 37. TI Grp. Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), 375 F.3d at 1139.  
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On occasion, the Board has declined to resolve the patentability of 
claims despite acknowledging them to be indefinite, and perhaps owing to 
that fact. For instance, in Headbox, LLC v. Infinite Imagineering, Inc., the 
Board reviewed the specification to identify structure corresponding to a 
single means-plus-function claim, claim 23, and found none.38 The Board 
concluded that the absence of sufficient structure “render[ed] claim 23 
indefinite.”39  After analyzing the remaining claims, the Board found all 
others to be obvious.40 The final written decision found unpatentable every 
claim except claim 23, about which it remained silent.41 
Under some circumstances, the Board has determined during the trial 
phase that indefiniteness precludes the Board’s ability to compare the 
challenged claims to the prior art. In these cases, the Board has terminated 
proceedings with respect to the indefinite claims. To illustrate, in Blackberry 
Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, the Board terminated the proceedings sua 
sponte, reasoning that the indefinite nature of these claims precluded the 
Board from conducting the necessary factual inquiry under Sections 102 and 
103. 42  In Microsoft Corp. v. Enfish, LLC, the Board, in a final written 
decision terminated proceedings with respect to certain instituted claims 
reasoning that because the claims were indefinite, they were not amenable to 
construction without speculation.43 
C. Indefiniteness Presented in Trial Stage, but  
Claims Can Be Compared to Prior Art 
On the other hand, the Board has encountered claims, which it found 
could be compared to the prior art, notwithstanding underlying 
indefiniteness issues. For example, in Apple Inc. v. Valencell Inc., the Board 
held that the claims it identified as indefinite were obvious over the prior art 
after ascribing a particular meaning to the indefinite claim term.44 The Board 
conducted a similar analysis in HID Global Corp. v. Idemia Identity & 
 
 38. No. IPR2014-00365, Paper 11 at 6–7, 13 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2015) (“As discussed above, claim 
23 is indefinite.”). 
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Id. at 8–15. 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. No. IPR2013-00036, Paper 48 at 20 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 7, 2014). 
 43. No. IPR2013-00559, Paper 65 at 14 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2015). 
 44. No. IPR2017-00315, Paper 45 at 49 (P.T.A.B. May 31, 2018) (“[W]e find that, to the extent the 
proposed substitute claim 13 is understood as reciting a light guide with a flat-faced end surface that has 
a narrower field of view than a light guide with a rounded end surface, Petitioner has demonstrated that 
the claim is obvious over the combination of [cited references].”). 
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Security USA, LLC, in which it determined that certain substitute claims were 
indefinite.45 Yet, notwithstanding this determination, the Board concluded 
that substitute indefinite claims “would have been obvious over [the prior 
art].”46 Similarly, in the Vibrant Media case discussed in Section I.B above, 
the Board explained in its final written decision that it was “. . . not necessary 
for [it] to determine whether [the claims] complie[d] with § 112, ¶ 2. . .” 
because it could “. . .ascertain the scope of each limitation with reasonable 
certainty.”47 After comparing the indefinite claims to the prior art, the Board 
found that the claims were obvious.48 
Regardless of the timing, postures, and outcomes of these cases, one 
common theme prevails—the Board frequently makes explicit 
determinations concerning whether IPR-challenged claims are indefinite, 
even if it does not cancel claims on that basis. 
II. THE CURRENT STATUTE 
As discussed above, the Board has consistently taken the view that it 
does not have the statutory authority to invalidate claims as indefinite in final 
written decisions. A closer look at the statutory language and its underlying 
purpose demonstrates that the issue of whether the Board has the authority 
during IPRs to cancel claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) is not so clear cut. 
In fact, the plain text of the statute does not expressly limit the Board’s 
authority in this manner. Instead, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) requires the Board to 
issue “a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent 
claim challenged by the petitioner.”49 Standing alone, the section’s broad 
language—“with respect to the patentability of any patent claim”—cannot 
be limited only to patentability determinations under Sections 102 or 103 
because the corresponding section for PGRs uses the same language,50 and 
it is undisputed that the Board can cancel a claim as being indefinite in a 
PGR.51 Nor does Section 311(b) restrict the broad authority granted to the 
 
 45. No. IPR2017-01939, Paper 35 at 108 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2019).  
 46. Id. at 115, 127. 
 47. No. IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 at 10–11 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2017). 
 48. Id. at 17–34, 38–39. 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) (“If a post-grant review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of 
any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 326(d).”). 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (scope of PGRs includes invalidity grounds that could be raised under 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of 282(b)); 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (listing failure to comply with any 
requirement of Section 112 except best mode, i.e., including definiteness requirement of Section 112(b)); 
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Board under Section 318(a). While Section 311(b) limits the grounds on 
which a petitioner can request an IPR to Sections 102 and 103,52 it says 
nothing about the authority of the Board or Director to cancel claims on 
particular bases. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Section 311, which restricts the grounds that 
may be challenged by the petitioner, Section 318 is claim specific and does 
not restrict the Board’s cancelation authority to the proposed grounds. 
Congress could have written Section 318 to limit the Board’s final written 
decisions to grounds raised by the petitioner but chose not to. Instead, it 
broadly authorized the Board to issue a final written decision with respect to 
the patentability of any—i.e., every53—challenged claim. Indeed, before 
Cuozzo, then-private practitioner Andrei Iancu co-authored an article 
observing that “the text of the statute potentially grants the Board the power 
to make final determinations on any patentability ground, including 
indefiniteness[.]”54 
Despite the statute’s broad language, however, one of the few points of 
agreement between the Cuozzo majority and dissent was that the Board may 
not cancel a claim for indefiniteness in an IPR.55 In dissent, Justice Alito 
contended that cancelling a claim as indefinite under Section 112 “would 
grossly exceed the Patent Office’s authority.”56 The majority did not dispute 
the point, applying Justice Alito’s label of “shenanigans” to the hypothetical 
agency action of “canceling a patent claim for indefiniteness under § 112.”57 
The Supreme Court’s disdain for canceling indefinite claims during IPR 
was not lost on the Board. According to the Board, “Cuozzo held that in an 
IPR proceeding the Board may not cancel a claim under Section 112.”58 But 
the holding in Cuozzo was more circumscribed: the Court held only that the 
statutory limitation on appeals from institution decisions, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), 
 
see also Telebrands Corp. v. Tinnus Enter., LLC, No. PGR2015-00018, Paper 75 (Dec. 30, 2016) 
(canceling claims as indefinite in a PGR).  
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 
1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on 
the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”) (emphasis added). 
 53. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018) (“In this context, as in so many others, 
‘any’ means ‘every.’ The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them all.”). 
 54. Andrei Iancu, Michael Fleming & C. Maclain Wells, Indefiniteness in Inter Partes Review 
Proceedings, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 4, 16 (2016) (emphasis in original). 
 55. Compare Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016), with id. at 2154–
55 (Alito, J., dissenting in part). 
 56. Id. at 2154 (Alito, J., dissenting in part). 
 57. Id. at 2142 (quoting Justice Alito’s dissent; internal quotation marks omitted).  
 58. eBay Inc. v. Glob. Equity Mgmt. (SA) Pty. Ltd., No. IPR2016-01829, Paper 66 at 5 (P.T.A.B. 
Oct. 16, 2018). 
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precludes judicial review of a “decision to institute inter partes review” 
where “the grounds for attacking the decision . . . consist of questions that 
are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the 
Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review.” 59  The Court’s 
holding did not extend to whether the Board could cancel claims for 
indefiniteness. Nor did the Court perform any analysis of Section 318 to 
support its statements regarding the supposed impropriety of canceling 
claims as indefinite during IPR. The plain language of Section 318, therefore, 
appears to provide latitude for the Board to cancel claims as indefinite, even 
if a petitioner is not permitted to argue for institution based on the 
indefiniteness of the claims under Section 311. 
In addition to the plain language, allowing the Board to cancel indefinite 
claims in an IPR would help further the fundamental purposes of creating 
these proceedings in the AIA. In particular, sponsors noted the AIA would 
help “establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will 
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive 
litigation costs.” 60  The Board already considers claim construction a 
necessity to any determination of novelty and obviousness.61 And as the 
Federal Circuit recognizes, “indefiniteness is a question of law and in effect 
part of claim construction.”62 For its part, the Board is presently considering 
issues of indefiniteness, even while it embraces the notion that it is not 
statutorily permitted to find the claims unpatentable for this reason. 63 
Changing the Board’s practice to permit full consideration of indefiniteness 
issues would increase the efficiency of testing the validity of challenged 
claims by leveraging the efforts already expended by the Board and 
preventing the repeat of the same process at a later date in district court. This 
change would also obviate the Board’s current toe-in-the-water approach in 
IPRs of determining the issue of indefiniteness while failing to assign any 
legal import to that determination. 
 
 59. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141. 
 60. 157 CONG. REC. S5327 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also 157 CONG. 
REC. S1360–94 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer); 157 CONG. REC. S1053 (daily ed. 
Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) (“[T]he bill will improve administrative processes so that 
disputes over patents can be resolved quickly and cheaply without patents being tied up for years in 
expensive litigation.”). 
 61. E.g., Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00036, Paper 65 at 7 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 9, 2013) (explaining that a “determination of anticipation and obviousness over prior art begins with 
claim construction” because “[i]t is axiomatic that we first must know what is being claimed.”) (citing In 
re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 62. ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 517 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 63. See supra Section I. 
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Of course, one counterargument is that allowing the Board to decide 
indefiniteness in an IPR blurs the distinction between IPRs, where a 
petitioner cannot challenge a claim on indefiniteness grounds, and PGRs, 
where a petitioner can make such a challenge.64 This may be true, but the 
Board’s current practice already blurs this distinction. Moreover, other 
distinctions such as patent eligibility and written description still distinguish 
PGRs from IPRs. Those issues do not share the same efficiency rationale as 
indefiniteness: unlike patent eligibility and written description, the Board is 
already making the indefiniteness determinations as part of the first (claim 
construction) step of its prior art invalidity analysis. 
Thus, it is not difficult to find justification for authorizing the Board to 
cancel indefinite claims in an IPR based on the text and the purpose of the 
AIA.65 If the Board were to interpret the statute to permit it to do so, this 
would be a marked departure from the cases discussed in Section I, and the 
Office would need to ensure that such a change fully comports with due 
process and the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. As an 
alternative approach, however, Congress could amend the statute to 
expressly authorize the Board to cancel claims for being indefinite during 
IPR, effectively endorsing (and assigning legal effect to) the indefiniteness 
determinations the Board is already making. 
III. A PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT 
The Board is already making indefiniteness determinations, even if it is 
not expressly statutorily authorized to cancel claims based on its 
determination. As discussed above, the Board has made express findings that 
claims are indefinite on a number of occasions. 66 And when the Board does 
not make such express findings, the Board is still making an implicit 
determination that the claims are sufficiently definite to allow comparison of 
claims to the prior art. Permitting the Board to hold claims invalid as 
indefinite in a final written decision would further Congress’s stated 
justifications for creating the IPR proceedings. In particular, amending 
Sections 311 and 318 to explicitly authorize the Board to determine 
patentability under Section 112(b) would alleviate the conflicting directives 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra notes 49–54, 60 and accompanying text. 
 66. See supra Section I. 
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under the current statutory interpretation and common law scheme, without 
having to engage in “shenanigans.”67 
The following amendments to Sections 311 and 318 would give the 
Board explicit authority to cancel claims as indefinite, in furtherance of 
Congress’s intention to provide a more efficient alternative to district court 
litigation and eliminate duplicative claim construction proceedings:68 
35 U.S.C. § 311 (b) Scope.— 
A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as 
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be 
raised under section 102, or 103, or 112(b). For grounds raised under section 
102 or 103, a petitioner may only rely on and only on the basis of prior art 
consisting of patents or printed publications. 
35 U.S.C. § 318 (a) Final Written Decision.— 
If an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this 
chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision 
with respect to the patentability under section 102, 103, or 112(b) of any 
patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under 
section 316(d). 
 
The statutory amendments would both further the legislative intent 
behind creating IPRs and increase efficiency in validity determinations 
associated with infringement litigation. 
During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s debates regarding versions of 
the bill that would later take shape as the AIA, two of the bill’s sponsors 
touted the speed and cost savings associated with IPRs. Senator Grassley 
hailed IPRs as “new procedures” that would provide a “faster, less costly 
alternative[] to civil litigation to challenge patents.”69  Similarly, Senator 
Hatch praised that IPR proceedings were “a cost-effective alternative to 
formal litigation.”70 Permitting the Board to decide issues of definiteness 
promotes a speedier resolution of indefiniteness issues because the Board 
inevitably engages in claim construction to conduct the Sections 102 and 103 
 
 67. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
 68. To facilitate identification of proposed changes, additions are shown in italics and deletions in 
crossed-out text. 
 69. 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011). 
 70. Id. at 951. 
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patentability analyses.71 Pursuant to the proposed statutory amendments, the 
parties would receive a decision on the definiteness of the claims when the 
final written decision issues, rather than delaying the determination until a 
district court begins to construe the claims and faces the same questions of 
indefiniteness that the Board previously encountered. 
Expressly permitting the Board to rule on indefiniteness issues arising 
during the claim construction process has the further advantage of lowering 
costs to the parties and the judicial system. For instance, this change would 
shield the parties and the courts from undue litigation resulting from 
situations in which only indefinite claims survive the IPR or are not 
challenged in the first place because the present statutory scheme supposedly 
prevents such challenges. Moreover, because estoppel attaches to any ground 
the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” in the IPR, patent 
owners would be assured that a defendant/petitioner in a subsequent 
proceeding could not raise an indefiniteness challenge against claims that 
survived IPR, providing litigants more certainty.72 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As long as the Board is engaged in claim construction, indefiniteness 
issues will continue to plague IPR proceedings. The current practice of 
identifying indefinite claims, yet declining to cancel them, frustrates the 
efficiencies sought by creating IPRs and leaves all litigants without final 
resolution on the question of indefiniteness. With two simple statutory 
amendments, Congress could resolve the difficulties litigants face in dealing 
with potentially indefinite claims while increasing the efficiency of these 
proceedings in accord with its original justification for creating IPRs. 
 
 
 71. See, e.g., MPHJ Tech. Invest., LLC v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 847 F.3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(“To determine the validity of a patented invention, the meaning and scope of the claims are first 
determined.”) (citing Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)–(2). 
